Using survey data on expectations, we examine whether the post-war data are consistent with theories of a self-fulfilling inflation episode during the 1970s. Among commonly cited factors, oil and fiscal shocks do not appear to have triggered an increase in expected inflation that was subsequently validated by monetary policy. However, the evidence suggests that, prior to 1979, the Fed accommodated temporary shocks to expected inflation, which then led to permanent increases in actual inflation. We do not find this behavior in the post-1979 data.
Introduction
The post-war inflation experience of the U.S. economy is dominated by the dramatic acceleration of inflation during the decades of the 1960s and 1970s and the sharp disinflation of the 1980s. The sustained peacetime inflation of the 1970s had no parallel in the previous 100 years of U.S. history.
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Why was inflation so high in the 1970s and low in the 1980s and 1990s? Recent, and perhaps controversial, theories of high and low inflation episodes center on the idea that inflation can rise because increases in expected inflation become self-fulfilling due to accomodative monetary policymaking and institutions. One avenue by which self-fulfilling inflations can come about is that the monetary authority may find itself in a bind when confronted with an upward revision to inflation expectations: It can either choose to accommodate the higher expectations, resulting in higher actual inflation, or it can choose not to accommodate and suffer the consequence of a drop in output and employment. In this light, the experience of the 1970s is interpreted as demonstrating that monetary policymakers were unwilling to pay the costs of disinflation in an environment of rising expected inflation. On the other hand, during the 1980s, monetary policymakers were willing to pay the costs of disinflation, and inflation came down rapidly, though at the cost of a severe recession.
1 See DeLong (1997) We examine whether the post-war data are consistent with theories of a self-fulfilling inflation episode during the 1970s that was reined in by more aggressive monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s. The unique aspect of our empirical methodology is the use of a long time series on inflation expectations from the Philadelphia Fed's Livingston Survey. Since 1946, this survey has been recording forecasters' expectations of CPI inflation and many other macroeconomic variables.
The benefit of using the survey data is that we have independent information on inflation expectations and so do not have to impose modeling assumptions to generate those expectations.
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The Livingston Survey data are used in several small VAR models to study whether monetary policy in the 1970s accommodated sudden movements in expected inflation resulting in highly persistent actual inflation. Our evidence suggests that it did. Results from a VAR estimated using pre-1979 data show that temporary shocks that increased expected inflation led to permanent increases in actual inflation. However, over the 1980s and 1990s sample period, we do not find this permanent inflation response to temporary shocks.
The theories that underlie self-fulfilling inflations suggest there may be a permanent rise in inflation in response to temporary shocks to fundamentals or to exogenous movements in expectations via sunspot equilibria. We investigate the response of inflation expectations to 2 Although the Michigan Survey of Households and the Survey of Professional Forecasters also maintain a database on expected inflation, their series start in the 1960s.
oil-price shocks, monetary policy shocks, and fiscal shocks. For the most part, we find that oil, fiscal, and monetary shocks are not associated with long-lasting, statistically significant increases in expected or actual inflation. We do, however, find a strong and significant inflation response to exogenous shocks to expected inflation: A one-time exogenous increase in expected inflation leads to significantly higher inflation 10 years after impact. The design of the Livingston Survey is such that it gives a natural restriction that helps identify these exogenous movements in expected inflation. Consistent with theories that associate sunspots and self-fulfilling inflations with monetary policy that did not react aggressively to inflation, we find that the 1970s represent an episode in which exogenous increases in expected inflation were accompanied by a falling real interest rate. We also show that expectations shocks are much more important for the variability of inflation and the unemployment rate than monetary policy shocks.
Expectations shocks account for approximately 30 percent of the variability of inflation and 30 percent of the variability of unemployment in the pre-1979 data. In comparison, the contribution of monetary policy shocks for both inflation and unemployment variability is about 5 percent during the same period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the theoretical findings of models of self-fulfilling inflation and the channels through which they operate. We then describe the behavior of actual and expected inflation since the mid-1950s and 5 discuss our identification procedures for the different shocks we wish to analyze. Section 5 introduces the benchmark model and describes our main findings, and Sections 6 and 7 conduct some sensitivity analysis.
The last section concludes.
Theories of Self-Fulfilling Inflation
The expectations trap hypothesis, as developed in Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1998), and Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2002), provides a mechanism by which expected inflation can become selffulfilling in a dynamic, general equilibrium environment with rational agents. These models build on the time-inconsistency literature of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) in modeling policymakers at the level of objectives and constraints, but extend those models by explicitly modeling the actions of a rational private sector.
In general, an expectations trap is a situation in which a benevolent monetary authority may be pushed into accommodating the inflation expectations of the private sector because the cost of not doing so is an undesirable loss of output and employment. Dynamic inconsistency and lack of a commitment technology lead to the possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling inflations. In Chari et al. the absence of commitment brings about two types of expectations traps.
In the first, agents expect monetary policymakers will react to shocks that don't affect preferences or technology. Thus, nonfundamental 6 shocks may become a source of volatility for the economy. In the second type of expectations trap, the monetary authority may overreact to fundamental shocks, amplifying volatility. In this situation, temporary shocks to fundamentals may lead to long-lasting effects on variables like inflation. In the expectations trap models, the principal driving force for multiplicity of equilibria is that defensive actions taken by households and firms to protect themselves from high inflation reduce the costs of inflation for policymakers. In Chari et al.
and Albanesi et al. unexpected inflation raises output because some prices are sticky. Monopoly power causes output to be inefficiently low. When firms expect high inflation, they set high prices. If the monetary authority does not accommodate, output will be low hence, the monetary authority has an incentive to validate high expected inflation. On the household side, agents take defensive actions against inflation by shifting consumption away from goods that require cash for their purchase. This lowers the cost of unanticipated inflation and gives the monetary authority incentive to inflate.
A second, closely related line of research that investigates selffulfilling inflation outcomes is the work of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Gust (1999, 2000) . These models differ The key mechanism by which these models can deliver self-fulfilling inflation outcomes is that the coefficient on expected inflation in the Taylor rule is less than one. Thus, a rise in expected inflation leads to a fall in the real interest rate. In Clarida et al., this stimulates spending by standard sticky-price mechanisms, leading to a rise in output that eventually gives way to a rise in inflation. Fed believed that bringing down expectations would require a recession whose economic and political consequences were deemed to be unacceptably high.
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The Fed saw itself on the horns of a dilemma: recession or inflation. We will show that identifying what could be a sudden, unanticipated rise in expected inflation, or the response of expected inflation to different shocks hitting the economy, is required before the self-fulfilling inflation hypothesis can be rejected.
Fundamentals or Sunspots?
Several Under the self-fulfilling inflations hypothesis, any increase in expected inflation, exogenous or endogenous, could lead to permanently higher inflation under an accommodative monetary policy.
Oil and Government Spending Shocks
The self-fulfilling inflation hypothesis requires that an increase in expected inflation, by whatever means, leads to an increase in actual inflation. Here, we discuss two fundamental shocks that may have led to increases in expected inflation.
The sudden and unprecedented rise in oil prices in 1973-74 and again in 1979 is a widely cited factor in explanations of the 1970s inflation (see Blinder [1979 Blinder [ ,1982 ). Prices for crude oil rose from about $3 per barrel in mid-1973 to more than $10 per barrel in 1974.
At the end of 1978, oil prices averaged about $14 per barrel, and then rose to more than $30 per barrel in 1979. Hamilton (1983) convincingly demonstrates that exogenous oil price increases Grangercaused most economic downturns in the post-World War II period. To identify exogenous, unanticipated increases in oil prices, we use the quantitative dummy variable developed by Hamilton (2000) . This variable captures the disruptions in the oil market due to political events in the Middle East that are arguably exogenous to developments in the U.S. economy.
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The dummy variable takes a value equal to the drop in oil production for these historical episodes and is otherwise set to zero. To identify fiscal shocks, we use the narrative account of Ramey and Shapiro (1998 
Expected Inflation Shocks
In the Chari et al. model that delivers self-fulfilling inflation equilibria, expectations can react to fundamental shocks or to pure sunspots.
Even more so than in the case of oil and fiscal shocks, identifying an exogenous movement in expected inflation is difficult. However, we exploit the design of the Livingston Survey to aid in identifying expected inflation shocks. An understanding of our identification scheme 7 Hamilton identifies the following dates as being associated with exogenous declines (in paren- 13 requires some detail on how the Livingston Survey is conducted.
The survey, which was initiated in 1946, reports eight-month-ahead forecasts by a pool of professional forecasters, on several economic variables. The forecasters are from nonfinancial businesses, investment banking firms, commercial banks, academic institutions, and from labor, government, and insurance companies. 9 The survey is conducted twice a year. Survey questionnaires go out in May and November, after the release of the CPI data for April and October, and are returned before the release of the CPI data for May and November (see Croushore [1997] ). 10 A timeline of the survey is shown in Figure 2 . It may be the case that forecasters, when forming expectations for 9 The average number of responses for the survey is about 50. The Livingston Survey data can be accessed at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/liv/index.html 10 Note that the CPI data are released with a one-month delay.
the survey, may have access to within-period information unobserved by the econometrician that give information about actual inflation.
In effect, this means that expected inflation would be responding to contemporaneous data. It takes time to mail out and receive the survey, and agents are continuously updating their forecasts over this time. Since we cannot fully include agents' conditioning sets in our VAR, it is sensible to think of allowing expected inflation shocks to be contemporaneously conditioned on other variables in the model. We conduct sensitivity analysis on our benchmark model by assessing the importance of alternative Cholesky orderings for the results.
Empirical Model
We set up a benchmark VAR with six variables: expected CPI infla- 
13
Finally, note that since the frequency of our data differs from that of Hamilton's (2000) quarterly analysis, the timing of our dummy variable is slightly different from his. We constructed our dummy variable by setting the drop in production equal to that in Hamilton (1999), whenever one of the historical episodes he described falls within one of our six-month periods. The same is true of our dating of the Ramey-Shapiro (1998) fiscal shocks.
Our benchmark model is a VAR on expected inflation, inflation, commodity prices, the unemployment rate, and the federal funds rate:
where Y t is a 5x1 vector of data and D t represents a dummy variable for oil (O). When we analyse the effect of government spending shocks, we replace the oil dummy variable with the Ramey-Shapiro fiscal dummy (G). 14 A(L) and B(L) are finite-ordered matrix-polynomials in nonnegative powers of L, the lag operator. SIC tests indicate that two lags are sufficient to capture the system dynamics. 13 The potential problem with aligning the data as we do is that serial correlation may be introduced because of the overlapping data intervals. However, this does not appear to be a severe problem, since the unit of time in our VAR (six months) is longer than the period over which the data overlap (two months). Formal tests suggest that serial correlation is not a problem in our VAR. 14 Because there are relatively few data points per estimated VAR coefficient, the effects of oil and government spending shocks are analyzed separately. era. On the other hand, we can reject the hypothesis that actual and expected inflation follow unit processes in the post-1979 period, though we cannot reject the null for the nominal interest rate and the unemployment rate. These results suggest that temporary shocks to either fundamentals or to expectations could, a priori, lead to permanent effects on inflation in the 1970s, but that this will not occur in the post-1979 era. To verify this conjecture, we now look at the response of the economy to oil, fiscal, expectations, and monetary policy shocks. percent and 90 percent confidence intervals. 16 The figure shows that, pre-1979, a temporary oil shock initially leads to a significant rise in 16 We use the bootstrap Monte Carlo method described in Eichenbaum (1998). The results were similar when we computed the error bands using Kilian (1998) bootstrap-after-bootstrap method.
Oil Shock
both expected and actual inflation, but the response of these variables is not significantly different from zero two years after the shock. Positive oil shocks lead to a rise in the unemployment rate (of about 21 basis points), two years following the shock. In the post-1979 period, inflation rises more on impact and the unemployment rate rises by less than in the pre-1979 period.
The pre-1979 estimates show that the real interest rate falls in response to a positive oil shock, reaching its maximum drop about two years after the shock. 17 Thus, the monetary policy response to inflation appears to less aggressive than in the post-1979 period in which the real interest rate rises following the oil-price shock. However, since the temporary oil shock does not lead to a long-lasting effect on actual inflation, we conclude that it is unlikely that this shock is the trigger that set up the inflation take-off in the 1970s.
Fiscal Policy
We use Ramey and Shapiro's (1998) fiscal dummy variable to investigate whether a positive, transitory fiscal shock in the mid-1960s led to long-lasting inflation. This could have occurred if it led the public to revise their inflation expectations upward, and the Fed then validated these expectations. Figure 4 shows the impact of a transitory 17 The real interest rate response is constructed as the difference between the nominal interest rate response and the expected inflation response.
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fiscal shock in our model. The figure presents impulse response functions only for the pre-1979 period, since we do not have a shock to government spending that falls in the post-1979 era. the inflation rate.
Monetary Policy
Can monetary policy shocks account for the high inflation of the 1970s? Figure 5 presents the response functions of the variables to a onepercentage-point increase in the nominal interest rate. 19 In the pre-1979 period, the increase in the nominal interest rate initially raises the real rate because expected inflation is predetermined in our benchmark specification. Actual and expected inflation rise, suggesting a strong Fisher effect. Actual and expected inflation fall in the long run (although the confidence intervals include zero). In the post-1979 period, contractionary monetary policy leads to a sharp drop in expected and actual inflation about one year after the shock. The rise in the unemployment rate 18 months after the shock is significant at the 68 percent level in both the pre-and post-1979 periods.
As is the case for oil shocks and fiscal shocks, unexpected changes in the nominal interest rate do not lead to significant, permanent changes in expected or actual inflation. Our results suggest a factor other than unanticipated monetary policy shocks was responsible for the persistent rise in inflation in the pre-1979 period. 20 19 Our impulse responses to expectations and monetary policy shocks are normalized such that the contemporanous own responses are unity. 20 We also ran our VAR with the monetary base in place of the short-term nominal interest rate as a monetary policy variable. Qualitatively, our results are the same under these two VAR specifications.
Expected Inflation Shocks
Consider now the effect of an unanticipated, one-time shock to expected inflation. Figure 6 
Sensitivity Analysis
To gauge the sensitivity of our results, we modify the benchmark specification to take into account two possibilities: (i) agents' inflation forecasts are conditioned on contemporaneous data, unobserved by the econometrician, so that expected inflation is not predetermined;(ii) the behavior of the economy after 1979 is contaminated by the inclusion 
Omitted Fundamentals?
Of course, any expectations shocks that we claim are exogenous could only be so to the extent that our statistical model includes all the fundamentals that drive movements in expected inflation. Since it is unlikely that any model could take into account all the variables agents use in making inflation forecasts, we think of our identified expectations shocks as being due to sunspots and/or to omitted fundamentals. To the extent that our model includes the fundamentals that drive expected inflation, the probability that our identified expectations shock is exogenous is higher. Note, though, that for the self-fulfilling inflations hypothesis this distinction is not so important.
Both transitory fundamental and expectations shocks can have longlasting effects on inflation through the interaction of expectations and monetary policy.
To gauge the exogeneity of our expected inflation measure, we follow a strategy similar to that in Francis and Ramey (2001) . We back out the structural shocks to expected inflation implied by our VAR and test them for exogeneity with respect to macro variables that might plausibly affect expected inflation. Thus, we regress expected inflation shocks on a constant and, alternatively, two lags of the growth rates of the US/Canada exchange rate, the US/UK exchange rate, PPI price index, the S&P500 stock index, and the monetary base.
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The results of this exercise are reported in Table 3 This gives support to the hypothesis that our measure of expectations shocks can reasonably be thought of as exogenous.
Conclusion
We examined whether the post-war data are consistent with theories of a self-fulfilling inflation episode in the 1970s. Using a survey mea- 23 We use the monetary base since it is the only monetary aggregate with a long enough time 
